Dutch politics VII - The three-party system

From 1977 to 1994 the three-party system, present but not very clearly visible since World War II, reached its zenith. In addition, the two-block system that was the result of the polarisation during the times of trouble became embedded in Dutch politics. This page studied both of them.

Fair warning: this is the political system I grew up with, so I unconsciously see it as the correct way of describing Dutch politics. The 1977 elections are the earliest ones I remember, though I was 7 at the time and didn’t care all that much.

Train hijacking

The context of the 1977 elections was very unusual. A few days before the elections a train was hijacked by Moluccans — descendents of Dutch colonial soldiers. The complicated background will have to wait until later; here it is enough to say that during an earlier hijacking a few hostages were killed, and government wanted to prevent this from happening again. In addition, Moluccans took a primary school hostage.

A crisis team was formed, with Den Uyl and Van Agt being the most important members. Van Agt

The 1977 elections formed a watershed. PvdA, VVD, and the newly-formed CDA, decimated the small parties, who went from 47 to 20 seats. The voters were tired of the plethora of medium-sized parties that characterised the last ten years, and concentrated in one party on the left, one in the centre, and one on the right. This was to remain the case until the next watershed elections of 1994.

This process of consolidation was speeded on by Den Uyl inventing the prime-minister race. The PvdA slogan in 1977 was “Elect the prime minister,” and the combined magic of the position of prime minister and Den Uyl’s considerable personal charisma did the job: the PvdA won no less than ten seats, jumping from 43 to 53 — the largest number of seats ever held by a single party after 1918.

These seats came from the smaller left-wing parties, who ceased to be a factor. Similarly, the VVD on the right won six seats from the smaller parties, who disappeared entirely in the next elections. The CDA stabilised. Only D66 was able to remain barely afloat, winning 2 seats, but no position of power.

Thus ended the times of trouble and started the years of the three-party system. Freed from smaller parties, PvdA, CDA, and VVD proceeded to parcel up Dutch politics.

The end of polarisation (1977-1982)

Dries van Agt (1931; KVP, later CDA), justice minister 1971-1977, prime minister 1977-1982, Queen’s Commissioner in Noord-Brabant 1983-1987, European Union representative in Japan (1987-1989) and the US (1989-1995).

During his ministership Van Agt wasn’t afraid of controversial decisions. In 1972 he came with an abortion proposal (which he later retracted), and he wanted to pardon three war criminals. He was forced to retract this pardon after severe criticism from parliament and society.

During the Den Uyl government Van Agt tried to close down Bloemenhove, one of the country’s earliest abortion clinics. This led to a frightful row within government, where the progressive majority rejected Van Agt’s actions. However, the incident helped him define an ethically conservative point of view that could serve as a binder for the slowly emerging CDA.

Van Agt was a proponent of the christian-democratic merger, and in 1970 had combined with anti-revolutionaries and other catholics to request the party leaderships of KVP, ARP, and CHU to merge into a progressive christian-democratic party. By the time he became the first leader of that party, the progressivism had been partly lost, and Van Agt had become a moderately conservative politician; mostly compared to the radical leftists of the PvdA.

When Den Uyl died, his family refused to admit Van Agt to the funeral.

Van Agt is known for his unique, archaic way of speaking Dutch. During his prime ministership he liked being photographed on his racing bike, but opponents accused him of faking his interest in race biking; something he has always denied.

Nowadays Van Agt is supporting the Palestinians against Israel, a subject he regularly speaks and publishes about. See also his website.

In 2009 he accepted the annual Cannabis Award of the Hashis Museum in Amsterdam, given to him because of his key role in formulating the current tolerant Dutch cannabis policy.

The 1977 formation is still a tender point for older PvdA members. While the PvdA won the elections convincingly, it lost the formation.

The PvdA, being the largest party, had the right of initiative in the formation, but Den Uyl found himself in exactly the same position as Drees back in 1956: his only possible coalition partner was his largest competitor, the CDA. The small left-wing parties had been swept away, and a coalition with the VVD was unthinkable.

Van Agt I

The PvdA, being the largest party after the elections, had the right of initiative, but it could do preciously little with it. Its victory had come at the expense of the small left parties, its natural allies.

In fact, the only choice the PvdA had was starting the negotiations with the CDA, although Den Uyl and Van Agt still didn’t like and trust each other. The PvdA demanded the participation of D66, the CDA demurred, months passed, and ever so slowly the two parties were compromising on issue after issue. When the time came to decide on the ministers in the new government, however, Den Uyl refused the CDA candidate for Economic Affairs while the PvdA party council rejected the proposed division of ministries. Back to square one.

It was five months after the election now, and the PvdA had clearly wasted its right of initiative. The CDA quickly proposed a coalition with the VVD, and within a month Van Agt and Wiegel could present a new government.

It’s hard to avoid the impression that the CDA had deliberately stretched and stretched the negotiations in order to give the PvdA enough rope to hang itself. Conversely, the PvdA eagerly participated in its own political execution by demanding concession after concession from the christian-democrats. Den Uyl may have been a visionary prime minister; as a formation tactician he left quite a bit to be desired; especially when confronted with Van Agt.

In 1980 Queen Juliana abdicated and was succeeded by her daughter Queen Beatrix.

Van Agt II: the government of rivals

After the next elections the roles were reversed. Although the CDA had become the largest party (it had lost one seat, but the PvdA had lost nine), it couldn’t continue the centre-right coalition; the two parties combined had lost three seats and with them their majority.

D66 being the great winner of the elections, it made sense to invite it to fill out a new, three-party centre-right government, but D66 refused to form a coalition without the PvdA.

Van Agt had no choice and the 1977 negotiations started all over again, including the old arguments between Den Uyl and Van Agt. D66 leader Terlouw proposed that both rivals resign from their leadership posts and withdraw from active politics, but that didn’t happen.

Den Uyl’s problem was that Van Agt would become prime minister, and in return he demanded, and got, minister of social affairs with a very wide-ranging array of powers regarding labour questions. Even before government was officially presented the first break between PvdA and the other two parties occurred, and although it was mended within days, this was not a good sign.

This government lasted for only nine months. The PvdA wanted to allocate more budget to job creation and less to defense. When CDA and D66 disagreed, the PvdA walked out and new elections became necessary.

Although the personal tension between Van Agt and Den Uyl played a major role in this drama, it should not be overlooked that Den Uyl’s handling of the budget affair went over well with the voters; he was rewarded with three more seats.

1982: Fresh blood

Ed Nijpels (1950), VVD party leader 1982-1986, housing and environment minister 1986-1989, Queen’s Commissioner in Friesland 1999-2008.

Nijpels entered parliament in 1977, and when Wiegel resigned just before the 1982 elections he was elected VVD fraction chairman and thus political leader. Because he was officially responsible for the 1982 election victory, Nijpels began his tenure very positively. Still, the 36 VVD seats would have been impossible without Wiegel’s ground-breaking work in the seventies.

Nijpels remained in parliament during the first Lubbers government, but he didn’t act very independent from government. Several affairs weakened his position, and when the VVD lost 9 seats to the CDA in the 1986 elections, Nijpels was politely asked to resign. This opened a period of chaos within the VVD that was ended with Bolkestein’s accession to the party leadership in 1990.

Nijpels became a mayor and Queen’s Commissioner, and held several board posts in the private sector, among with the DSB Bank which failed spectacularly in 2009. It remains to be seen whether Nijpels will survive the fallout.

When surveying his political career one cannot escape the feeling that Nijpels was moved into the top slot slightly too early.

Just before these 1982 elections, VVD party leader Wiegel resigned. He had helped the VVD forward immensely, and the upcoming elections would prove his masterpiece, even though he himself formally had no role in them.

Directly after the elections, Van Agt also resigned as party leader, and his successor was Ruud Lubbers, who would dominate the twelve next years. Of the three old rivals, only Den Uyl was left, but he was once again in charge of the largest party.

Den Uyl took the initiative, but when he sounded out the CDA the reply was a polite but firm No. The huge winner of the elections was the VVD, which had won the unprecedented number of 36 seats, and with them an easy CDA+VVD majority. The new centre-right government was quickly formed under the prime ministership of Lubbers.

The three-party system

Although occluded by the rancorous arguments between Den Uyl and Van Agt, this confused series of moves illustrates the outline of the Dutch three-party system.

Two out of these three combine to form a coalition, and sometimes they need (or want) a third, smaller, party in government.

The results of polarisation

One of the conclusions we must draw from the times of trouble is that polarisation works. Dutch voters prefer a clear left-centre-right division. When PvdA and VVD play their archetypical roles of polarisers on the left and right, they gain seats because there’s a clear difference between them and the CDA.

(That is, they gain seats combined. Their individual scores are not predicted by this law.)

Therefore, it would seem that polarisation is in the interest of both; as long as they battle each other and clearly profile themselves, they gain in stature and power.

Although that’s true, the process of polarisation simultaneously strenghtens the CDA; not necessarily in number of seats, but definitely in political power. After an election campaign during which PvdA and VVD fight each other to the hilt it makes little sense for them to forget their differences and combine to form a government.

Even when the PvdA becomes the largest party through judicious use of polarisation, its first step is sounding out the CDA about a possible coalition. Drees encountered this problem in 1956, and Den Uyl in 1972, 1977, and 1982.

Conversely, if PvdA and VVD play nice in order to remain acceptable to one another as coalition partners, they lose seats, and the CDA still becomes the most powerful party in the country, takes the initiative and selects the VVD because it’s smaller than the PvdA.

The only way to remove the CDA from its position of power is a less polarising approach by the PvdA and VVD combined with a sharp drop in CDA votes, caused, say, by part of its base temporarily defecting to single-issue parties. That’s exactly what happened in the 1994 Purple elections, and it changed the face (though not the underlying dynamics) of Dutch politics.

But we’re getting ahead of ourselves; Purple is still twelve years in the future. The Lubbers era was the height of CDA power; the degree to which PvdA and VVD polarised mattered for their exact number of seats, but not for their general position of dependence on the CDA.

The imbalance

The three-party system has one fundamental imbalance: the right is smaller than the centre and the left. In good years the VVD is about three-quarters of the size of either PvdA or CDA; in bad years about half.

At first sight that would appear to diminish the power of the right, but that turns out not to be quite true; the VVD participates in government more often than the PvdA.

Part of the reason is simple power politics. If the CDA has to choose between the roughly-equal PvdA and the distinctly smaller VVD, it will obviously go with the second option, because that increases its relative power within government.

Thus, the CDA will feel a natural attraction to the smaller VVD, while it cooperates with the equal-sized PvdA only when forced to do so. We saw this in the Van Agt years; we’ll see the same pattern in the Lubbers and Balkenende years.

In order to function as a true three-party system, where centre-left and centre-right coalitions have a roughly equal probability, it would have to be the CDA that’s the smallest party. In that case, the elections would determine whether the PvdA or the VVD became the largest party, and the winner would take the initiative and invite CDA into government.

That’s not how the system works, though. The fact that the right is smaller allows the right to rule more often than the left, but strengthens the centre in the end.

VVD in government

Besides, there’s a price to pay for governing. One iron law of Dutch politics is that the VVD loses seats after government participation and wins them after spending a few years in the opposition. Since 1977 there are only two cases in which the VVD wins after government participation: the 1998 and 2003 elections. The 2002 and 2006 elections conformed to the rule.

VVD voters want a right-wing party. During a CDA+VVD coalition, however, they see their party diluting its principles by cooperating with the centre; and usually diluting them by quite a lot because the CDA is so much larger than the VVD. The next time, they stay home disgruntled, or opt for another party.

Besides, during years when the VVD is in office, it cannot polarise effectively; after all it has its coalition partner to think of. The PvdA is not similarly constrained.

Conversely, if the VVD has the luxury of waging opposition against a centre-left government, it can broadly and cleanly present its right-wing views, and its voters will eagerly flock to its colours during the next elections.

PvdA in government

The reversed pattern holds true for the PvdA. It participates in government only after losing an election. When it wins, it is shut out of the halls of power. This pattern exists since 1977, and it was broken only in 1998 and 2002. The 2003 and 2006 elections conformed to the rule.

The PvdA’s position is more tenuous after an electoral loss, and the CDA’s position correspondingly stronger. The fact that the CDA feels safer about its main competitor, and that that competitor is more humble, makes for smoother government formation. Therefore the CDA is more likely to seriously consider a centre-left government.

A PvdA in the flush of victory — a victory won by polarisation, most likely — has higher demands and is much harder for the CDA to handle. The VVD option seems all the more alluring to the centrists.

The forbidden coalition

There’s one forbidden coalition: PvdA+CDA+VVD. (It’s usually referred to as the “Grosse Koalition” — and that’s German, not Dutch; the subtext is something like “Just because the Germans do it doesn’t make it proper!”)

The great coalition would invalidate the entire three-party system; if all three parties cooperate in serving the same kind of bland centrist soup, what’s the point of choosing between them?

Such a coalition would spell absolute disaster for PvdA and VVD because they cannot out-centre the CDA. Their vain attempts would draw them to the centre, and they’d face serious threats from their out flanks; exactly what’s happening nowadays, with the SP attacking the PvdA from the left and the PVV haunting the VVD from the right.

It’s harder to estimate the effect of a great coalition on the CDA; on the one hand such a government’s policies would resemble the CDA’s platform more than the PvdA’s or VVD’s; on the other hand the CDA, too, would be implicated in a government that’ll probably be wildly unpopular.

The one coalition that’s worse than the great one is a PvdA+VVD coalition without the CDA, but with, for instance, D66. It leads to much the same results, except that the CDA keeps its hands clean and can present itself as a serious alternative to an unpopular government. That’s what happened in 2002, after Purple had made itself impossible.

The CDA’s role is being centrist. PvdA and VVD belong on the flanks; and any excessive centrism on their part is punished. (And that’s the root cause of the current instability of the political system.)

The only way to get rid of the CDA and its position of supreme power is for it to lose its attraction to the voters. Although that temporarily seemed to happen during the Purple years, the CDA has come back — to a degree.

The Lubbers era (1982-1994)

Ruud Lubbers (1939) KVP economics minister 1973-1977, CDA parliamentary leader 1978-1982, party leader 1982-1994, prime minister 1982-1994, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2001-2005.

In the sixties Lubbers was part of the KVP’s left wing, and he was an initial member of the group that eventually founded the PPR. Lubbers decided to stay within the KVP.

He was Den Uyl’s economics minister, and had to deal with the consequences of the first oil crisis.

In 1977 he became second man of the CDA fraction in parliament, and when parliamentary leader Aantjes had to resign because of his possible SS membership during the was, Lubbers succeeded him. During the Van Agt government he was mainly preoccupied in keeping the smallish CDA left wing in parliament loyal to the centre-right government.

When Van Agt suddenly resigned, Lubbers became CDA party leader and the youngest ever prime minister. With twelve years he is also the longest-sitting Dutch prime minister.

He became the face of the harsh eighties, where his government was responsible for major cuts in the welfare system and wages. Partly due to the economic climate, the CDA shifted right during his first government.

Lubbers tried to handle his own succession correctly by announcing his 1994 resignation well in advance, and allowing parliamentary leader Brinkman to become his official crown prince years beforehand. However, Brinkman thought to consolidate his own position by attacking Lubbers, and the CDA 1994 campaign descended into chaos, which led to the Purple coalition and the CDA’s exclusion from the halls of power.

In 2000 he became UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Criticism of the UN agency became markedly less during his tenure, and he restored its financial sanity.

In 2004 he was accused of sexual intimidation of a female subordinate, and although initially the accusation was judged baseless, a rehash of the story the next year caused Lubbers to resign.

Back home he concentrated on the environment and fugitives, and held a very well received speech at a pop music festival. He is still active on these topics.

In 2006 the Queen appointed him informer for the caretaker Balkenende III government.

Just after the 1982 elections Ruud Lubbers succeeded Van Agt as CDA party leader, and pretty soon he became prime minister of a CDA+VVD coalition. He was to stay in the top slot for twelve years; he is the longest-sitting prime minister by far.

The PvdA wasn’t quite done polarising, and it was in an excellent position with the VVD’s hands being tied in government.

Lubbers’s first government featured a nearly-equal VVD, and that meant the right had more influence than usual, resulting in all kinds of policies that drew the fury of the left; and Den Uyl once more took on the role of leader of the opposition, while behind the scenes his potential crown princes started to plot and scheme.

The CDA shifts

Nonetheless, something changed during the first Lubbers government. The CDA, in addition to serving its usual electorate of christian voters also became associated with a moderate centre-right economic policy.

In fact, this mirrored the demands of its voters. Already during the 1977 formation, when Van Agt bravely pretended to negotiate with the PvdA, far more CDA voters wanted a centre-right than a centre-left government. In the mid seventies and early eighties, it was especially the party leaders who were left-leaning. The base had a slight but clear right shift.

So the shift actually made the CDA more palatable to many voters, including those voting primarily for economic reasons and currently leaning toward the VVD.

Essentially, Lubbers gave up on the old christian centrist scheme. He positioned the CDA ever so slightly right of the centre; not quite enough to scare the few remaining left-wingers, but enough to make voters understand that their right-wing ideas were shared by the CDA, and that, due to its size, that party might be a better option than the VVD.

Although the three-party system remained in force, it was supplemented by the two-block system that we’re going to treat in a moment.

1986: The prime-minister race

In the 1986 elections CDA and VVD were very clear about wanting to continue the coalition. The CDA, however, added another factor. It structured its campaign around the central issue of giving Lubbers a chance to “finish his job,” thus basically making the elections a referendum about the (popular) prime minister.

The idea was not new. Den Uyl had done exactly the same in 1977, when he scored his greatest victory (+10 to 53 seats!) after an “Elect the prime minister” campaign built around his person. Now the aging lion had to contend with his erstwhile economics minister in a similar race.

As could be predicted, the Lubbers vs. Den Uyl contest drew many voters from the smaller parties to the CDA and PvdA. Den Uyl scored his second-best win; 52 seats, only one less than the magic 1977 number.

Lubbers, on the other hand, won 54, one more than Den Uyl’s magic number. He won nine, the VVD lost nine. The prime-minister race combined with the CDA’s right-shift and its increasing palatibility to VVD voters had won the day.

Lubbers took the initiative and constituted a new CDA+VVD government in which the VVD’s role was diminished to helping him finish his job.

Den Uyl finally decided to resign. Wim Kok became PvdA party leader, and Den Uyl died not long after from a brain tumor; authentically mourned by both the left and the right.

The PvdA and VVD shift

During the Lubbers II government the PvdA started to shift ever so slightly to the political centre. New party leader Wim Kok was less outspoken than his predecesor, and he understood what Den Uyl never wanted to see: in order to rule, the PvdA had to let go of its most extreme demands and show itself able to compromise with the CDA.

At the same time, the Lubbers II government was a more strained one than its predecessor. The VVD had lost in the 1986 elections, became rather nervous about continuing cooperation with its largest competitor, and tried to compensate by shifting even more to the right.

Tensions grew, until in 1989 the VVD rejected a financial part of the CDA’s environmental plans that touched the interests of car drivers — and the personal liberty of driving has always had a significance in VVD thought.

Lubbers, tired of his coalition partner and being able to do some basic electoral math, chose to interpret this as a vote of no confidence and resigned.

1989: the switch

In the 1989 elections the Staatkundige Federatie (Political Federation) won 31 votes, which makes it the worst-scoring party in Dutch history.

Ed van Thijn (1934), PvdA interior minister 1981-1982 and 1994, mayor of Amsterdam 1983-1994.

The 1989 elections again confirmed Lubbers’s grip on electoral dynamics. The VVD, who’d caused the crisis, lost again, as did the PvdA. The CDA stayed stable at 54 seats.

The centre-right coalition now had a minimal majority of 76 seats, and although PvdA-CDA talks were already under discussion before the elections, Lubbers first tried to get D66 to join the old coalition. Just as in 1981, D66 refused to enter government without the PvdA. That meant the end of centre-right government.

Obviously, a PvdA+CDA government did not need D66 for a majority. Nonetheless, propriety demanded that now that D66 was asked to participate, though under strict conditions. When D66 refused those conditions CDA and PvdA went on anyway, and quickly formed a centre-left government.

The third Lubbers government was a success in that it served for the full four years (slightly more, in fact, due to the 1989 elections being held late in the year). However, it was hard for both government partners to distinguish themselves from each other; government policy was a centre-left soup that completely satisfied neither party or its voters. The PvdA had become too centrist; the CDA too left-wing.

Finally, what’s the point of having two rival large parties when they govern together? Where’s the choice in that situation?

Leadership questions

Long before the 1994 elections Lubbers announced he would resign as prime minister and party leader when his third government drew to an end. This gave the CDA plenty of time to decide on his successor; and eventually the anti-revolutionary Elco Brinkman was chosen.

During the campaign Brinkman tried to distinguish himself from Lubbers and his third government by shifting a bit to the right. As an electoral strategy this was sound; the VVD could be expected to win some seats, and a new centre-right coalition was only to be expected after the 1994 elections.

However, Brinkman made some remarks that Lubbers interpreted as a personal attack, and the relation between the two men became strained. What could have become a smooth transition turned into a nightmare.

Just before the elections, Brinkman made a capital mistake by saying that pensions, just like welfare, should be “frozen” (i.e. not even adjusted for inflation).

This, now, was electorally unsound. Older voters disproportionately opt for the CDA as a stable centre party, but they expect their hard-earned pensions to be safe in its hands. When that turned out not to be the case, two new parties were formed to defend the rights of the elderly. They won seven seats from the CDA.

1994: the breaking of the rules

The 1994 elections turned into a nightmare for the CDA. It lost no less than 20 seats; to date the largest loss for any party in Dutch history. The fact that the PvdA also lost 12 was not enough to console the centre party. The big winners of the elections were D66, which doubled to 24 seats, and the VVD, which won back the nine seats it had lended to the CDA in 1986.

The three-party system tottered. The PvdA+CDA coalition as a whole had lost 32 seats, turning its comfortable 103 seats majority into a 71 seat minority. The last time the PvdA’s and CDA’s predecessor parties did not command a majority was way back in 1897.

A new era dawned, in which D66, especially, changed the face of Dutch politics. They still haven’t recovered.

The two-block system

The three-party system, which had its heydays under Lubbers, is not enough for understanding the finer points of Dutch politics. There’s also a two-block system, in which the left and right blocks compete with each other for power and the right is slightly larger.

Only by picturing them as a three-party system and a two-block system simultaneously can we understand the inner workings of Dutch politics.

(And I’ll give you fair warning: there’s a four-party system coming up in the next article; with the two blocks each containing two large parties.)

The blocks

Obviously, the PvdA leads the left block. In addition it contains some small left parties, as well as D66. In fact, the old Progressive Agreement of the early seventies is the precursor and inspiration of the left block, and from 1971 to well into the early eighties it functioned as one block during government formation.

So the PvdA has smaller allies on the left. The VVD and CDA do not; although there are usually a few populists in parliament, their parties cannot be considered serious government partners because they are too extreme, have too few seats, or (usually) both.

From a power-political point of view, it’s therefore easy to see that, faced with a left block that is far larger than either of them separately, CDA and VVD combine to form the right block, which is slightly larger than the left one and rules the country most of the time.

The 70 to 80 seats on the right

But the existence of the right block goes beyond power politics; there are genuinely a lot of voters that are comfortable with either CDA or VVD. These voters are secular; people who vote CDA because it’s a Christian party are less willing to consider the VVD.

This block of voters, worth roughly nine seats, are at the centre of every CDA and VVD electoral calculation. Whoever gets them, wins the elections. They went to Lubbers in 1986, back to the VVD in 1994, and we’ll see them swing back once more to the CDA in 2002.

Lubbers steered the CDA somewhat away from christian politics toward moderate-right economic policies. Combined with his prime-minister appeal, this caused him to convince the crucial vote block voters to support him, and not the VVD.

In the 1994 elections, these voters were disappointed in the CDA because of the centre-left government it had formed, and flocked back to the VVD.

As a rule of thumb, the CDA has a fixed vote of 25 to 30 seats, the VVD about 15 to 20. The remaining 20 to 25 volatile seats are re-divided every election, and although only about 10 of them were truly contested in the Lubbers years, future elections would produce wilder swings on the right.

In recent years the populist parties have demanded their share of the volatile right vote. As a result, the two other parties lost some seats and with them their majority. In fact, the 1989 elections were the last ones that gave CDA and VVD a majority, however slight, in parliament.

As a whole, the right block has lost seats from 1989 onward, and nowadays it’s not certain to gain a majority even together with the populists.

The populists’ claiming of about 5 to 10 seats constitutes a genuine change in the right block’s make-up; the CDA’s and VVD’s share of the vote has tightened since 2002, and it remains to be seen how they cope with that problem.

(The correct response would be the VVD veering sharply rightward to re-capture the populist vote. For reasons beyond my comprehension, the VVD has not taken this obvious course of action.)

The 65 to 70 seats on the left

Unsurprisingly, we see a similar division between fixed and volatile seats in the left block. There’s one difference with the right block, though: several smaller parties compete for the seats the PvdA drops, instead of there being one large second party. Of course, the PvdA is by far the largest left party (until the 2006 elections, that is).

As a rule of thumb, the PvdA has about 25 to 30 fixed seats. GL and D66 each seem to have 3 to 5 of them, and the SP maybe 5 to 10 (though we can’t really analyse the SP before it loses an election).

The remaining twenty to thirty seats are volatile; they’re re-distributed every election, and as the largest party the PvdA usually takes the lion’s share.

The PvdA’s main competitor on the left changes over time. Directly after the war it was the CPN, centrist D66 took the role during the times of trouble and the Lubbers and the Purple years, and recently left-wing SP became the second party on the left.

Despite all these mutations the left block as a whole is suprisingly stable at around 65 to 70 seats. Although it dropped sharply in the 2002 elections, the two elections after that saw the left swiftly moving back to its old share of the vote.

Nonetheless, the SP’s recent huge gains considerably tighten the amount of seats available to the PvdA. Whether the 2006 SP results are an outlier or part of a trend is as yet unclear; but the PvdA definitely has problems.

(The correct response would be the PvdA veering sharply leftward to re-capture the SP vote. For reasons beyond my comprehension, the PvdA has not taken this obvious course of action.)

In 2006 the CU entered government; and it is the first small protestant party to ever do so. As a result the protestant block may be up for a re-evaluation. It’s especially interesting to see whether the CU will threaten the CDA’s christian underbelly that no other party can reach.

The third block

The name “two-block system” is a bit misleading. There is in fact a third block: the protestant one. It is incomparably smaller than the other two, though, and excluded from most political calculation — until 2006.

The problem is that nowadays neither the left nor the right block can win a majority in parliament. That suddenly puts the protestants in the nexus of power — again.

The prime-minister race

In the struggle to capture as many volatile seats as possible, the CDA and PvdA, as largest parties in their blocks, operate at a clear advantage. They can increase this advantage by turning to their obvious allies: each other.

CDA and PvdA have the power to turn an election into a prime-minister race; inviting voters to decide whether they want the CDA or the PvdA party leader for prime minister.

In a prime-minister race the sitting prime minister tries to lure voters from the same block by asking them to help him remain in his position, which would otherwise be claimed by the leader of the other block. That leader uses similar logic to persuade voters in his block.

It was Den Uyl who invented the race in 1977. Lubbers improved on the concept in 1986 and kept a firm grip on the 1989 elections, and Balkenende succesfully repeated the performance in 2003. The three CDA victories caused CDA-led governments. The single PvdA victory also caused a CDA-led government.

The purpose of the prime-minister race is not to gain voters from the other block. By re-casting the elections as a prime-minister race, the CDA and PvdA aim to attract voters whose first choice would be another party in the same block.

These voters are offered the opportunity to decide who will become the next prime minister by voting for the large party they mostly agree with anyway; and that turns out to be a powerful lure. Both the 1977 and the 1986 prime-minister race saw slaughter in the ranks of the small left parties, while the latter race also decimated the VVD.

Consequences of a CDA+PvdA coalition

However, the prime-minister race also holds danger to CDA and PvdA. They may grow so huge that they’re more or less condemned to form a government together.

That’s what happened in 1977, and it took Van Agt months of patient nudging to get the PvdA to blow up negotiations. In 1989 Lubbers was less lucky; he had no alternative, and although the PvdA had mellowed by then, the fundamental dangers of the CDA+PvdA coalition remained the same.

From a theoretical point of view the PvdA+CDA coalition causes the same problems in the two-block system as the PvdA+CDA+VVD “Grosse Koalition” does in the three-party system. When both parties serve the same bland centrist soup, what’s the point of choosing between them, even in a prime-minister race?

The 1994 elections proved the inherent unsafety of forcing two parties who derive their legitimation from being opposed poles to cooperate in one government. Voters react by voting for another party in the same block. Right block voters moved to the VVD, as well as to the ephemeral parties for the elderly, while left block voters moved to D66.

However, 1994 is an outlier scenario so far. There is no general rule that says CDA and PvdA both lose heavily after a coalition; see the 1977 and 1982 elections.

The difference between 1994 and the earlier elections may be explained from the fact that the Den Uyl and Van Agt II governments fell before their time, and for clearly ideological reasons. Maybe voters reward that kind of behaviour.

The 1989 coalition, on the other hand, served for the full four years with only little overt tension — wholly in line with the “no-nonsense” Lubbers era. Maybe voters punish that kind of behaviour.

In this respect the next elections will be a significant data point. Will the two large parties be punished for the 2006 CDA+PvdA+CU coalition? And will government serve out the full four years? Precedent suggests that the fall of government might help CDA and PvdA, provided that the break occurs on clear ideological grounds.

VII.The three-party system